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1. Cross-border philanthropic activity is increasing 
(including activities by foundations, other public-benefit 
organisations – PBOs - and their donors).
2. Almost all Member States provide for tax incentives for 
philanthropic activities. Since the 1990s the trend is that 
these incentives are being extended. 
3. Traditionally, Member States have limited eligibility 
for tax-privileged status to resident PBOs and their 
donors. However, following several key judgements (the 
“Stauffer”, “Persche”, and “Missionswerk” cases), the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has developed a general 
non-discrimination principle, according to which an 
EU-based foreign PBO is entitled to hold the same tax-
privileged status as a national PBO, provided that it can 
be shown to be comparable to a national PBO. 
The subject of this study
4. In order to comply with the non-discrimination principle 
referred to above, Member States were supposed to 
adapt their legislations where necessary to remove all 
(tax) discriminations against “comparable” foreign EU 
based PBOs and their donors. This study investigates if 
and how the non-discrimination principle has been well 
and correctly implemented in the various Member States.
Implementation of the non-
discrimination principle
5. The non-discrimination principle established by the ECJ 
has not yet been implemented in the text of the national 
tax laws of all the 28 Member States. 
a. According to the interpretation of the country experts 
providing data for this study, there are still a number 
of cases in which the wording of Member States’ laws 
discriminates against foreign EU-based PBOs in certain 
circumstances. 
b. If we take the three ECJ cases referred to above as the 
basis for three key cross-border scenarios involving 
PBOs and consider whether the non-discrimination 
principle has been implemented in the laws applying 
to each of these situations in each of the 28 Member 
States, we find that in 22 of a possible 84 cases the 
wording of Member States’ laws discriminates(1) . 
c. Member States will have to change their laws in these 
cases. Strictly speaking, the laws must already be 
interpreted in such a way as to be in conformance 
with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, namely as providing for the possibility of a 
comparability test. But on a practical level this presents 
a problem: people and PBOs may be being prevented 
from claiming and receiving tax incentives that are due 
to them because it is not clear that the possibility to 
seek these incentives exists. 
d. Furthermore also in the remaining 62 cases in which 
the wording of the law does not discriminate against 
foreign-based PBOs and their donors, (practical) 
barriers continue to exist, since it is not at all clear 
under which circumstances Member States consider a 
foreign EU based PBO comparable to a resident one. 
There is no common approach as to how Member 
States check/test such comparability. 
Performance of the comparability test
6. In the majority of Member States, no formal or uniform 
approach to the comparability test is foreseen: Usually 
it is the competent tax authority which decides on a 
case by case basis whether a foreign PBO is considered 
comparable to a domestic one. In around 10 Member 
States, however, at least in certain cases we find formal 
procedures which set out the binding framework for 
determining whether a foreign PBO is comparable to a 
domestic one. 
7. In all Member States the burden of proof within the 
comparability test lies, in the case of tax incentives 
sought by a foreign PBO, with that PBO. In the case of 
tax incentives for donors giving to foreign-based PBOs, 
the burden of proof generally lies with the donor. The 
tax authorities often request that certain documents are 
(1) Three scenarios (Persche/tax incentives for donors giving abroad; Stauffer/
tax treatment of foreign PBO generating income; Missionswerk/gift and 
inheritance tax treatment of cross-border legacies/inheritances) multiplied by 
28 Member States provide 84 situations to consider.
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made available (in translation) by the PBO or the donor. 
Such documents frequently include the statutes of the 
PBO and the annual financial report. The procedures to 
show comparability vary across the Member States and 
they are often lengthy, costly and accompanied by a 
certain level of legal uncertainty 
8. The benchmark for the comparability test is the national 
tax law of the Member State from which the tax 
incentives are sought. Despite the differences between 
Member States’ tax laws, it is generally required that in 
order to receive tax privileges a PBO pursues a public-
benefit purpose. Typically, it should pursue this purpose 
exclusively and some Member States have stipulated 
further requirements. Tax laws differ in their details and 
it is often unclear at what level of detail the respective 
national tax law requirements have to be fulfilled in order 
to show a potential comparability. The practice can even 
vary from one authority to the other within one country.
Challenges and possible solutions
9. As referred to above, there are still cases where Member 
States’ laws are not in compliance with European law. 
The issue of non-compliance will be addressed in time 
through court cases and European Commission initiated 
infringement procedures.
10. Formal compliance does not however solve all problems. 
One key problem with the current system is that the 
comparability tests imposed by Member States are 
demanding and create significant legal uncertainty: long 
and complicated procedures, translation costs, and fees 
for legal/tax counselling.  
11. From a policy point of view, the main hurdle to solving 
existing barriers is a need among Member States to build 
more trust in each other’s systems by being assured 
that a certain level of control is guaranteed. Examples of 
attempts to develop simpler practice can be found in some 
Member States  (e.g. model certificate in Luxembourg) and 
it should be in the interests of all Member States as well 
as the sector (and society as a whole) to continue to try 
to simplify and ease the process of the comparability test. 
 
From a legal point of view, the following options to 
improve the situation exist:
a. The process of checking comparability could be eased 
through the use of binding multilateral or bilateral 
treaties which would enable a foreign-based PBO’s tax-
privileged status to be automatically recognised. 
b. If Member States are adverse to this type of 
permanent commitment model statutes, reflecting the 
requirements that would need to be fulfilled by a PBO 
in order for it to be eligible for tax-privileged public-
benefit status throughout the EU, could be established. 
c. Even a simplification of the procedural law could be 
helpful by, for example, limiting the checks carried 
out for the comparability test to some agreed core 
elements or to ensuring that only the specific donation 
will be used in accordance with the national law of the 
Member State from which the tax incentive is sought. 
Way forward from the perspective of 
EFC/TGE
The EFC and TGE, together with other partners,  are committed 
to working towards further developing and implementing best 
practices and proposals made in this study to further ease tax 
effective cross-border philanthropy.
Useful practical information on taxation of cross-border 
philanthropy can be found in the form of 28 detailed country 
profiles  on the EFC (www.efc.be) and TGE websites (www.
transnationalgiving.eu). The notes outline the relevant legal 
requirements and associated administrative procedures in 
each of the countries surveyed for this study.
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A. Introduction
1.1 Project outline and scope of 
the study 
This study explores the extent to which the non-discrimination 
principle developed by the European Court of Justice as 
regards tax privileges in relation to foreign EU-based PBOs 
and the associated requirement to conduct comparability tests 
have been implemented in the Member States.  
By way of introduction, the study will first give an overview 
of the economic significance of and the legal framework for 
institutionalised philanthropic activity in Europe (§ 1). The study 
will trace the legal developments which led to the development 
of the aforementioned non-discrimination principle (§ 2). 
Following that, the study will present a comparative legal 
analysis of how the Member States handle the requirements 
of this principle in practical terms. This analysis will focus 
on the three typical scenarios of particularly high relevance, 
mirroring the circumstances of the key European Court of 
Justice judgements in this field (§ 3). 
The analysis will first establish in which Member States the key 
scenarios concerning tax privileges are actually applicable (for 
example whether the taxes in question exist in the national 
law) (§ 4).  It will also identify whether foreign-based PBOs 
are or are not discriminated against, where such taxes and 
associated tax privileges exist (§ 5). Then we will look at how 
the comparability test arising out of the non-discrimination 
principle is applied in the individual Member States (§ 6) and 
outline which requirements foreign EU-based PBOs must, 
according to the national law of the Member State from 
which tax privileges are sought, fulfil in order to be deemed 
comparable to a domestic PBO (§ 7). Finally, the Study will 
outline potential regulatory policy options to ameliorate the 
current situation (§ 8) and will end with final conclusions (§ 9). 
 
1.2 Philanthropy: A major 
contributor to European 
society
Philanthropy, the support of public-benefit purposes through 
the use of private resources, is economically significant. 
Recent figures on TGE’s work also illustrate this demand: TGE 
is a network of public-benefit organisations that collaborate 
to enable donors to give gifts internationally while still 
receiving the tax benefits they would get for giving locally in 
their country of residence. TGE serves some 6,800 donors 
and nearly 300 beneficiaries in 17 countries. In 2013, TGE 
channelled over €8.5million of philanthropic funding across 
borders in Europe. The amount of funding that TGE deals with 
has increased year on year since the network was established. 
The rate of growth is becoming more rapid, with the biggest 
increase so far coming between 2011 (just under €5 million of 
funds channelled) and 2012 (over €7 million). 
One of the many varied forms that philanthropy can take is that 
of institutional philanthropy, conducted through PBOs. Public-
benefit foundations are one prominent kind of PBO. Up to 
date accurate empirical data on the philanthropic sector is not 
available. The 2009 European Commission Feasibility Study on 
a European Foundation Statute(2)  outlined, that the assets of 
public-benefit foundations in Europe represent a considerable 
economic weight. The study highlights foundations as 
a growing sector, with significant economic impact: the 
foundation sector in Europe consists of approximately 110,000 
foundations and numbers are increasing. In Spain, on average 
one new foundation is created each day, while in Germany 
the number is two, and by far the majority of them are public-
benefit foundations. The combined assets of foundations in 
Europe are estimated at some €1,000 billion, while they make 
annual expenditures for the public good of around €153 billion. 
Foundations also contribute to the economy and society in 
other ways, employing approximately one million full time 
equivalent staff and engaging around 2.5 million volunteers. 
(2) Feasibility Study on a European Foundation Statute (2009) 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/eufoundation/
feasibilitystudy_en.pdf.
1. Introduction and Background Information
Foundations as well as other PBOs have clearly become more 
and more active across borders. The EFC has seen among its 
members and partners that internationalisation has for some 
years been an important trend within the sector. Foundations 
working across myriad fields throughout Europe understand 
that the challenges they work to help society address and the 
benefits that they can bring to citizens do not stop at national 
borders. Whether undertaking joint initiatives, implementing 
multi-country projects, pooling resources, seeking to reach 
more beneficiaries, or raising funds from a wider pool of 
donors, large numbers of foundations(3)  want and need to be 
active cross-border to effectively pursue their mission. 
The feasibility study also reveals that people and assets have 
become more mobile – donors/founders have international 
assets and international interests. Their aims and their giving 
do not stop at national borders. Equally, many of the PBOs 
they support do not and cannot confine their activities to one 
country as the issues they seek to address are transcending 
national borders more and more.
1.3 Legal framework 
Across the Member States of the European Union there is a 
consensus that philanthropic activity by PBOs is desirable and 
should be encouraged by the state. 
All Member States therefore provide for legal forms that 
can be used for the pursuit of institutionalised philanthropic 
activities (e.g. foundations, associations, trusts). 
Furthermore, almost all Member States are familiar with the 
concept of tax exemptions for PBOs (e.g. exemption from 
inheritance tax and corporate income tax), as well as tax 
incentives for donors. Many Member States have increased the 
scope of these privileges considerably during the last 20 years 
as a means to incentivise philanthropic activities. 
(3) 2/3 of EFC members are active outside of their own country: 
http://www.efc.be/programmes_services/resources/Documents/EFC_
Brochure2011.pdf. 
What is the rationale for the special tax treatment of 
philanthropy? Tax laws themselves do not generally describe 
the rationale behind why legislators have introduced such 
benefits. In the US, the rationale for tax incentives for 
philanthropy has been discussed extensively by a number of 
researchers and some researchers in Europe have built upon 
this. Various theories have been developed over the past 50 
years to explain the role of PBOs in society and why their 
role should imply tax privileges(4) . It can be concluded that 
the main justification for tax privileges for philanthropy is 
the fact that PBOs and their donors benefit the state and the 
society. In short, governments give up part of their tax income 
because PBOs and their donors are engaging in activities 
which benefit the whole community. Tax privileges are also 
seen as an instrument for division of labour between the state 
and private actors when it comes to benefiting the general 
public. Underpinning this is an assumption that PBOs make 
an important contribution to the pluralism of a democratic 
society. 
 1.4 Typical cross-border 
philanthropic scenarios
Typical examples of philanthropic cross-border scenarios 
include: 
• A donor asks for tax incentives when giving across 
borders within the EU. 
• An EU-based PBO applies for tax benefits with respect to 
its investment income in another EU Member State. 
• A PBO receives a legacy from abroad and asks for 
inheritance tax exemption/reduction.  
The European Court of Justice has decided on such cases 
several times (see below under 2.3).
(4) Overview and examination of different theories can be found in Ineke 
Koele, International Taxation of Philanthropy, pages 61-68, IBFD Publication 
Amsterdam, (2007).
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2.1 Historically no tax 
privileges for foreign PBOs 
Just 10 years ago, the general rule to be found across the 
Member States was that tax incentives were restricted 
to domestic PBOs and donors giving to domestic PBOs. 
Foreign-based PBOs and donors giving across borders were 
consequently not able to obtain tax privileges. 
Explicit justification for the exclusion of foreign-based PBOs 
is typically not found in the legal texts. Legal scholars have 
outlined two main arguments. 
One conceivable reason for the exclusion of foreign-based 
PBOs from access to tax-privileged status, is that receipt of 
such support through the tax system is justified by some kind 
of domestic connection to the state in question. Some experts 
have tried to explain the traditional “domestic connection” 
or “landlock” approach to tax incentives in this way: Tax 
incentives for PBOs are given because those organisations 
fulfil tasks that are of interest and benefit to the state and 
should hence benefit the resident public-benefit community 
of the given state. 
It should be noted however that in no Member State has 
there ever been a requirement for a domestic connection so 
strict that it is necessary that the state be directly financially 
relieved of burdens/obligations by the philanthropic activity 
in question. No Member State limits the beneficiary circle of 
tax-privileged public-benefit activities to its own citizens or 
residents. Rather, all Member States permit that tax-privileged 
philanthropic activities may benefit foreigners living abroad. 
A second possible reason for the traditional exclusion of 
foreign-based PBOs from access to tax-privileged status is 
pure practicality: Foreign PBOs are governed by different 
legal provisions the comparability of which with domestic 
laws cannot, it is argued, readily be determined. In addition, a 
foreign PBO is by nature located in another territory, meaning 
that the national tax authority of the state from which the PBO 
is seeking tax-privileged status has no direct control over the 
foreign PBO nor any direct powers of intervention should the 
foreign PBO flout applicable legislation. While a request for 
assistance from the foreign authorities would be possibe, it 
would also be cumbersome. 
 2.2 The Non-discrimination-
rule of the ECJ 
The traditional regulatory approach as described above has 
however been overhauled: The European Court of Justice has, in 
a series of judgements specifically dealing with taxation of PBOs 
and their donors (e.g. Stauffer(5)  , Persche(6) , Missionswerk(7) , 
Laboratoires Fournier(8) , European Commission vs. Austria(9)) 
developed a general non-discrimination principle as regards 
tax law in the area of public-benefit activities(10)   and has set 
the following rules for Members States’ national tax laws:
• It is at the discretion of Member States whether or not 
they wish to provide for tax privileges for PBOs and their 
donors(11) . Similarly, Member States are in principle free 
to determine the relevant conditions and requirements. It 
is theoretically also permissible for the beneficiary circle, 
namely the recipients of the support of the PBO, to be 
(5) ECJ 14.9.2006 - C-386/04 (Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer/Finanzamt 
München für Körperschaften).
(6) ECJ, 27. 1. 2009 - C-318/07 (Hein Persche/Finanzamt Lüdenscheid).
(7) ECJ, 10. 2. 2011 - C-25/10 (Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach eV/Belgien).
(8) ECJ, 10.3.2005 - C-39/04 (Laboratoires Fournier SA/Direction des 
vérifications nationales et internationals).
(9) ECJ, 16. 6. 2011 -  C-10/10 (Commission/Austria).
(10) Apart from these cases the ECJ has also dealt with dividend withholding 
tax cases which are also of relevance to PBO investors - see ECJ, 20.10.2011 - 
C-284/09 (Commission/Germany).
(11) ECJ, Persche, para. 43.
2. The development  of  the  
non-discrimination principle
limited to domestic citizens or to persons living within the 
domestic territory(12) .  Member States are in particular 
not obliged to automatically grant a status equivalent 
to that of a domestic PBO to a foreign EU-based PBO 
recognised as holding tax-privileged public-benefit status 
in its country of origin(13) .
• However, limits to the scope of discretion of the Member 
States are established by the fundamental freedoms of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU:
 ° It is not permitted that foreign EU-based PBOs and 
their donors are excluded from eligibility for tax 
privileges if, seat aside, they fulfil all requirements of 
the national public-benefit tax law(14) .
 ° It is not permitted that a (domestic or foreign EU-
based) PBO is required to undertake its philanthropic 
activities in the Member State which grants the tax 
privilege, unless there are compelling objective reasons 
for this. Such reasons do not, for example, exist in the 
case of the promotion of science as a public-benefit 
purpose; Member States must not restrict tax benefits 
for donors of gifts made to domestic universities or 
laboratories(15) .
• It is necessary in cross-border cases that Member States 
carry out a comparability test to determine whether or 
not a foreign EU-based PBO meets the requirements 
of national tax law. Such tests are to be carried out by 
the national authorities and courts of the Member State 
concerned(16) .
• Within the framework of the comparability test the 
competent national authorities may require the foreign 
PBO, and/or as relevant its donors, to provide any 
documentation they deem useful for the carrying out of 
the comparability test(17) .
(12) ECJ, Stauffer, paras. 37f., 57, Missionswerk, para. 30
(13) ECJ Stauffer, para. 39; Persche, para. 48.
(14) ECJ, Persche, para. 46, Missionswerk, paras. 30-31.
(15) ECJ, Laboratoires Fournier, para. 23; Commission/Austria, paras. 35-38.
(16) ECJ, Persche, para. 49, Missionswerk, paras. 33-34.
(17) ECJ, Persche, paras. 53-58.
2.3 Relevant judgements 
The above described rules of the European Court of Justice 
are drawn from certain judgements through which the non-
discrimination principle has become established, making clear 
that philanthropic activities are protected by the fundamental 
freedoms enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. 
The restriction of these freedoms is therefore only justifiable 
and proportionate if the foreign PBO is not comparable to a 
domestic one; a blanket discrimination is not permissible. 
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Stauffer (C-386/04)(18)  
The case: An Italian foundation with its seat in Italy awards, in accordance with the purposes 
set out in its statutes, scholarships to young people from Switzerland, particularly those 
from Bern, to pursue studies in music. The foundation is the owner of a building in Germany 
from which it obtains rental income. The rental activity is dealt with by a German property 
management company. German tax law exempts PBOs from corporate income tax for this kind 
of rental income. However, this exemption would not be applied to foreign-based public-benefit 
organisations, even if they fulfil all the requirements outlined under German tax law.
Does this rule infringe the fundamental European freedoms?     
European Court of Justice: Rental income is protected under the free movement of capital. 
According to settled case law of the European Court of Justice, restrictions on the fundamental 
freedoms are only permissible if (1) they are applied in a non-discriminatory way, (2) are 
justified by overriding reasons in the public interest, (3) are an appropriate means to achieve 
the objective that they pursue, and (4) do not go beyond what is necessary and reasonable 
to achieve this objective. The less favourable treatment of foreign EU-based PBOs is not, in 
the view of the European Court of Justice, justifiable according to these criteria: although the 
need for Members States to be able to exercise adequate fiscal control can be considered an 
overriding reason in the public interest, the principle of proportionality prohibits irrefutable 
presumptions that are to the cost of the tax payer. Rather, the tax payer must be given the 
opportunity to bring forward supporting documents and evidence to enable the necessary 
checks on their having fulfilled the respective requirements to be carried out.  In particular, 
a restriction on tax incentives cannot be justified on the grounds that the organisation 
concerned has its registered seat in another Member State and that this hinders the 
clarification of the facts of the case and the application of the necessary procedures, because 
in such circumstances the Mutual Assistance Directive(19)  and the Recovery Directive(20)  would 
provide adequate protection. Furthermore, the risks of loss of tax revenues and of foreign 
EU-based PBOs engaging in money laundering for terrorist financing purposes do not justify 
a restriction of tax incentives. 
Conclusion: The rule of the German tax law is therefore invalid. A denial of the tax incentive 
would only be permissible if the Italian foundation was not (notwithstanding its seat) 
comparable to a German PBO. In this case the tax authority did not carry out a comparability 
test. 
(18) ECJ 14.9.2006 - C-386/04 (Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer/Finanzamt München für Körperschaften).
(19) Council Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation
(20) Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010 concerning mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to 
taxes, duties and other measures
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 Persche (C-318/07)(21)  
The case: German resident Mr Persche requested in his personal income tax declaration 
of 2003 a special deduction for an in-kind donation of bed and bath linen, walking frames, 
and other equipment. This donation was made in favour of the Centro Popular de Lagoa, a 
Portuguese PBO working on a number of social issues including providing care homes for the 
elderly. German tax law provides for a deduction for a donation made to a PBO. However, this 
tax incentive was not applied for donations to foreign EU-based PBOs, even in cases when the 
organisation in question met all the requirements set out in the German tax law. The fiscal 
authorities therefore rejected the request for the tax deduction. 
Does this rule infringe the fundamental European freedoms?
European Court of Justice: Donations (including in-kind donations) are protected under the 
free movement of capital. The discrimination in this case is not justifiable. The European Court 
of Justice recalled its remarks made in the Stauffer judgement, to which it explicitly referred 
several times. 
Conclusion: The rule of the German tax law is therefore invalid. A denial of tax incentives 
would be permissible only in the concrete case that the Portuguese organisation were not 
(notwithstanding its seat) comparable to a German PBO. In this case the tax authority did not 
carry out a comparability test.
(21) ECJ, 27. 1. 2009 - C-318/07 (Hein Persche/Finanzamt Lüdenscheid 07).
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Missionswerk (C-25/10)(22)  
The case: Missionswerk is a public-benefit association with its registered seat in Germany. 
Mrs Renardie, a Belgian citizen, who had lived her whole life in Belgium, died on 12 June 2004 
in Malmedy, Belgium, having appointed Missionswerk as her heir. The Belgian regional tax 
authority applied inheritance tax at a rate of 80%, amounting to €60,038.51 of tax payable on 
the inheritance Missionswerk was to receive. Missionswerk sought to have the reduced tax rate 
of 7%, which the tax authority of the Walloon region provides for legacies to resident PBOs, 
applied instead. The tax authority rejected the request for the application of the reduced tax 
rate on the grounds that it was only to be applied to foreign EU-based PBOs in cases where 
the testator had lived or worked in the country in which the foreign organisation was based. 
Does this rule infringe the fundamental European freedoms?
European Court of Justice: Legacies are protected under the free movement of capital. The 
discrimination in this case is not justifiable. The European Court of Justice recalled its remarks 
made in the Stauffer and Persche judgements, both of which it explicitly referred to several 
times.
Conclusion: The rule of the Belgian regional tax authorities is therefore invalid: a restriction 
on tax incentives would be permissible only in the concrete case that the German association 
were not (notwithstanding its seat) comparable to a Belgian PBO.  In this case the tax authority 
did not carry out a comparability test. 
(22) ECJ, 10. 2. 2011 - C-25/10 (Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach eV/Belgien).
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B. Comparative Legal Analysis 
The following comparative legal analysis is based on country reports provided by selected experts from all EU Member States. All 
experts were asked via a structured questionnaire to outline what have been the consequences in their country of the ECJ cases 
outlined above, as regards the academic discussion, the tax law and administrative practice. The individual country reports can be 
found as an annex to this study. The following discussion represents a general overview of the information in the country reports. 
3. Consequences of the ECJ decisions
3.1 Infringement procedures
The European Commission started infringement procedures in 
the field of public-benefit tax law in 2005. It looked both at the 
tax treatment of PBOs and at the tax treatment of donors. 28 
cases were successfully closed due to changes in legislation, 
and a few cases are still pending. 
Also in the field of discriminatory withholding tax on 
foreign investments, the European Commission has initiated 
infringement procedures against various Member States. 
There has also been a specific complaint launched by a Dutch 
public-benefit foundation with investments in various EU 
countries. 
3.2 Academic discussion in 
the Member States
The ECJ decisions, in terms of both theory and practice, have 
been discussed to varying degrees by the Member States. 
Whilst in some Member States there has been a wealth of 
academic articles and debate on this topic that it is almost 
impossible to overlook, in other Member States there are no 
publications on the subject.  Given that key cases involved 
Germany, significant academic literature on the taxation 
of cross-border philanthropy can in particular be found in 
Germany. 
3.3 Reactions of the Member 
States in legislation and/or 
practice
The case law/jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice 
has brought about the following reactions by Member States: 
•  The majority of Member States have adapted the text of 
their regulations and now deal explicitly with the non-
discrimination principle established by the European 
Court of Justice in their relevant tax laws (exceptions are 
discussed in more detail below under 5.2). 
•  However, the comparability test necessitated by the 
non-discrimination principle is specifically regulated by 
explicit new provisions in only relatively few Member 
States. In the rest of the Member States, existing general 
provisions are applied (this is discussed in more detail 
below under 6.3.2). 
• Thus far hardly any Member States have resorted to the 
possibilities referred to by the European Court of Justice 
to abolish tax privileges for PBOs altogether (which 
could be considered as negative implementation on the 
non-discrimination principle), or to limit the beneficiary 
circle of a PBO holding tax-privileged status to domestic 
citizens or domestically resident persons (exceptions are 
discussed in more detail below under 7.4.5)
European Commission vs. Austria (C-10/10)(23) 
The case: the European Commission alleged that the Austrian tax law, which only allowed tax 
deductibility for donations to institutions with research and teaching activities in cases where 
those institutions had their registered seat in Austria, was in conflict with the free movement 
of capital within the EU. 
Does this rule infringe the fundamental European freedoms?
The European Court of Justice: Donations are protected under the free movement of 
capital. The discrimination in this case is not justifiable. The European Court of Justice recalled 
its remarks made in the Stauffer and Persche judgements, to which it explicitly referred 
several times. The restriction of tax incentives only to donations made to domestic research 
institutions cannot be justified on the grounds of overriding reasons of public interest. This is 
because it stands in direct conflict with the goals of European policy in the fields of research 
and technological development, whereby according to the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
legal and tax obstacles to research co-operation should be removed. 
Conclusion: The Austrian law had to be amended to the effect that a restriction would only be 
applied if the foreign-based research institution were not (notwithstanding the location of its 
seat) comparable to an Austrian research institution. 
 
(23) ECJ, 16. 6. 2011 - C-10/10 (Commission/Austria).
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4. Existing taxes and tax privileges
Naturally, the question of granting incentives in relation to certain types of taxes is only relevant where those taxes exist. Therefore, 
this comparative legal analysis begins by looking at the situation in the Member States whose fiscal frameworks give rise to 
taxation which tax advantages might relieve. This study does not however intend to provide an exhaustive exploration of the highly 
complex rules relating to the taxation of PBOs and their donors. Rather the findings that follow present an overview, not a complete 
description, of the present situation.  It should be noted that tax privileges such as those available in relation to real estate tax, 
sales tax, VAT or other taxes are not considered here. 
4.1 Tax incentives for donors
Almost all Member States grant tax incentives for donations to PBOs, provided that certain requirements are fulfilled which are 
stipulated in the national tax law of the individual country concerned. 
In technical terms the most commonly found of such incentives is the tax deduction: the donor can deduct the amount donated 
from their personal taxable income. Alternative approaches exist but are rare (e.g. the Gift Aid Scheme in the UK) and from an 
economic perspective their effect is similar to the tax deduction scheme. 
Many Member States apply a limit or ceiling, up to which donations can be deducted. Some Member States further differentiate 
in their rules between types of donors (natural person/legal person) and/or the object of the donation (cash donation/in kind 
donation). It should also be noted that in all Member States there are delimitations (e.g. a donation is not for consideration, whereas 
sponsorship is), which for the purposes of this study will not be discussed further. 
As the two charts that follow show, Slovakia is the only Member State that has no tax incentives for donations to PBOs. All other 
Member States offer some form of tax incentive at least in certain cases. 
Country                                                                                                      Limit of incentive 
Austria Donations are deductible up to 10% of taxable income.
Belgium Cash donations of €40 or more are deductible up to 10% of the taxable income, with an absolute maximum of €376,350 for the tax year 2013. 
Bulgaria Donations are deductible at rates of 5, 15, or 50% of the income depending on the recipient. Total deduction cannot exceed 65% of the total income.
Cyprus The full value of donations is tax deductible with no limits. 
Croatia Donations are deductible up to 2% of taxable income.
Czech Republic Deductions up to 10% of taxable income, provided at least 2% of taxable base is donated, but not less than 1,000 CZK (approx. €35).
Denmark Donations exceeding 500 DKK (approximately €70) and up to 14,500 DKK (approximately €1,950), the limit for the 2013 fiscal year, are deductible. 
Estonia Donations up to the value of 5% of the donor’s total income can be deducted. 
Chart 1: Tax treatment of individual donors:
Finland No tax incentives for individual donors 
France
Income tax reduction at 66% of the value of the gift (75% for specific donations), 
up to 20% of the donor's taxable income. Alternatively wealth tax reduction of 
75% of the value of the gift, but is limited to €50,000.
Germany Tax deduction up to 20% of the yearly taxable income 
Greece
20% of the value of the gift may be deducted from the tax payer’s gross income 
up to 10% of the donor’s total income.
Hungary No tax incentives for individual donors 
Ireland
Tax credit of a blended rate of 31% for donations to approved charities, which is 
claimed by the charity provided donor has paid sufficient tax to cover the claim 
amount.  Minimum annual donation of €250 and maximum of €1m. If donor is 
associated with the PBO then maximum tax refund of 10% of her/his income tax 
applies.
Italy
Donations to ONLUS (Organizzazione Non Lucrativa di Utilita' Sociale) are 
deductible up to 10% of income with a maximum of €70,000. Alternatively 
tax credit of 26% (for year 2014) for donations to ONLUS and other kinds of 
charities, up to the value of up to €2,065. 
Latvia Income tax deduction up to 20% of the donor’s total taxable income.
Lithuania No tax incentives for individual donors but they can allocate 2% of their income tax to an approved PBO.
Luxembourg
Tax deduction up to an annual aggregate maximum limit of 20% of the taxable 
income of the donor or €1,000,000, provided the donations have an aggregate 
value in excess of €120.
Malta Cash donations made to certain organisations can be deducted with different caps of €50,000 or €60,000 or in some cases €100,000.
Netherlands Donations can be deducted up to 10% of the donor’s gross income. No deduction is possible for donations below 1% of the gross income or €60. 
Poland Donations of cash, shares, securities, real estate and in-kind donations are deductible up to 6% of the taxable base.
Portugal
Cash donations: income tax deduction up to 25% of the amount donated where 
there is no limit for corporate donors. Where there is a limit on deduction for 
corporate donors, the amount deducted by individuals should not exceed 15% of 
the value of the donor’s total income tax. 
Romania Donors can direct 2% of their income tax to NPOs. Contributions (sponsorship) are deductible up to 5% of total income.
Slovakia No tax incentives for individual donors. 
Slovenia Donors can direct up to 0.5% of their income tax.
Spain Tax credit of 25% of the value of cash or in kind donations up to 10% of total taxable income.
Sweden 25% of a donation 200-1,500 SEK (approx. €25-170) is deductible and total gifts amounting to at least 2,000 SEK (approx. €225). 
United Kingdom
Cash donations are deductible via Gift Aid or payroll giving schemes. The donor 
claims a deduction from taxable income or capital gains for the amount of the 
donation grossed up by the basic rate of tax (currently 20%). Gift Aid allows 
the charity to then reclaim the income tax deemed to be deducted from the 
donation from the tax authorities.
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Chart 2: Tax treatment of corporate donors
Country Limit of incentive
Austria Deductions up to 10% of taxable income. 
Belgium
Only cash donations (of more than €40), the exception being 
works of art donated to museums: up to 5% of the taxable 
income, with a maximum of €500,000 in 2013.
Bulgaria
Donations are not levied with a tax withheld at the source and 
lead directly to decrease of the financial result if they amount 
up to 10%, 15% or 50% (dependent on the recipient) of the 
positive financial result. The total amount of the deduction 
cannot exceed 65% of the total income.
Croatia 
In kind and monetary donations can be included in business 
expenses (which will decrease the tax base) up to 2% of the 
total revenue generated in the previous calendar year. 
Cyprus
Whole amount of the donation can be deducted - subject to 
certain conditions. The same conditions are applicable as to 
individual donors.
Czech Republic
The donation can be a movable asset or real estate. The 
donation is deductible up to 10% of the tax base provided that 
at least 2% of the tax base is donated.
Denmark
Gifts to qualifying charitable organisations exceeding 500 
DKK (approximately €70) up to 14,500 DKK (approximately 
€1,950) are deductible each year. The limit is adjusted annually 
and was 14,500 DKK for the fiscal year 2013.  
Estonia
Total of donations deducted from taxable income may not 
exceed 3% of the sum of the payments made during the year, 
nor exceed 10% of the calculated profit of the latest fiscal year.
Finland
Monetary donations made by corporations, with a minimum 
amount of €850, are eligible for a tax deduction. Maximum 
amount depends on the recipient, divided in two categories. 
Maximum amount of a donation given to a publicly financed 
university or to a fund within the university is €250,000. 
Maximum amount of a donation given to a public-benefit 
foundation is €50,000.
France
A tax reduction equal to 60% of the donations to qualifying 
PBOs up to 0.5% of their annual turnover. Should there be 
no profits in the following years, the deduction can be carried 
forward over the next five years. The deduction may also be 
carried forward over the following five years, if the donations 
are beyond the 0.5% limit. 
Germany A tax deduction on the income up to 20% of yearly taxable income (or 0.4% of the sum of the turnover and salaries).  
Greece Cash donations are deductible up to a maximum of 10% of the taxable income. 
Hungary
Up to 20% of the value of the donation (or the book value of 
the goods or services provided). 50% of the value if provided 
to certain national funds. An additional 20% of the value of 
the donation if provided under a long term donation contract, 
up to the amount of the pre-tax profit on the aggregate.  
Ireland Donations over €250 are deductible in full.
Italy
Cash donotaions only. Up to 2% of income up to €1,032.91  for 
donations to ONLUS (Organizzazione Non Lucrativa di Utilita' 
Sociale) and other NGOs. No limits on donations to universities 
or university foundations. Donations to ONLUS can be 
deduction from income tax up to an amount not exceeding 
10% of the total declared income. Maximum €70,000 per year. 
Alternatively, corporate donors can deduct from their declared 
income donations to ONLUS up to a maximum of €2065.83 or 
for an amount not excedding 2% of the total declared income.
Latvia
A tax deduction of 85% of donated sums, up to 20% of total 
payable tax.
Lithuania
Corporate donors can deduct cash, in-kind donations, and even 
services offered. Exception is cash payments beyond 250 MLS 
for one single recipient. In some cases, double the amount of 
the donation may be deducted up to 40% of taxable income. 
Luxembourg
Tax deduction up to an annual aggregate maximum limit 
of 20% of the taxable income of the donor or €1,000,000, 
provided the donations have an aggregate value in excess of 
€120.
Malta Only donations to certain specific organisations would be deductible
Netherlands
The amount of the donation can be deducted up to 50% of 
the profits with a maximum of €100,000 euro. Donations 
to cultural institutions can be taken into account for 150%. 
Maximum annual deduction in this case is €5,000.  
Poland Cash, shares, real estate and in-kind donations are deductible. Limit of incentive: 10% of the tax base.
Portugal
No limits on tax deduction when donations benefit state-
supported foundations or represent endowment of private 
origin foundations pursuing social or cultural aims. Donations 
are calculated as a cost to the donor and rates range from 120-
150% of the monetary value of the donation.
Romania Donations can be deducted up to 20% of the income tax, but not more than 0.3% of the turnover.
Slovakia No tax incentives in place for corporate giving. 
Slovenia
A tax deduction on the amount of donations up to 0.3% of 
the taxable income, but not exceeding the amount of the total 
tax base.  An additional deduction of up to 0.2% of taxable 
income for donations to organisations established for cultural 
purposes or for protection from natural and other disasters. 
Spain
Corporations can deduct from the amount of tax payable an 
amount equivalent to 35% of the deduction base, up to a limit 
of 10% of the taxable base for the corresponding period.
Sweden No deductions in general. However, some donations can be deducted as business expenses.
United Kingdom Money, land, and quoted shares are deductible. A 100% deduction from taxable profits can be claimed.
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4.2 Gift- and inheritance tax
To the extent that gift/inheritance tax is collected, it is typically levied by the Member State in which the testator was last resident. 
A different system seems to be in place only in Hungary. The tax payer is typically the heir or legatee. In certain cases, however, the 
living donor or heir (in the case of a legacy) may be jointly liable for the inheritance / gift tax. 
One should keep in mind that in recent years, a number of Member States have abolished their gift and inheritance tax laws. For 
those Member States, the question of a tax deduction in such circumstances will therefore be relevant, since the tax from which 
the exemption or reduction would be sought does not exist in the first place. 
In those Member States that do have gift and inheritance tax, tax exemptions are usually foreseen if the recipient is a PBO. 
Chart 3: Gift and inheritance taxation and tax benefits for PBOs 
Country                      Does gift/inheritance tax exist? Exemptions for domestic donations?
Austria No Not applicable
Belgium Yes Yes 
Bulgaria Yes Yes 
Croatia Yes Yes 
Cyprus No Not applicable
Czech Republic Yes Yes 
Denmark Yes Yes 
Estonia No Not applicable 
Finland Yes Yes 
France Yes Yes 
Germany Yes Yes 
Greece* Yes No
Hungary Yes Yes 
Ireland Yes Yes 
Italy Yes Yes 
Latvia No Not applicable
Lithuania Yes Yes 
Luxembourg Yes Yes 
Malta Yes, stamp duty No 
Netherlands Yes Yes 
Poland Yes Not applicable since levied only on natural persons
Portugal Yes, stamp duty Yes
Romania No Not applicable 
Slovakia No Not applicable
Slovenia Yes Yes 
Spain Yes Not applicable since levied only on natural persons
Sweden No Not applicable 
United Kingdom Yes Yes 
4.3 Tax treatment of PBOs
A PBO would generally be taxed on rental and lease income through the application of income tax or corporation tax. Again here 
we find technical differences: Some Member States do not tax the income of the organisation, instead taxing only shareholder 
dividends. 
Tax privileges for PBOs do exist in the majority of Member States, but typically not for all the different types of income of the 
organisation. More often distinctions are made between specific types of income.
* Pending ministerial clarification
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5. Treatment of cross-border scenarios
As already outlined under 3.3., the majority of Member States have adapted the text of their regulations and deal explicitly with the 
non-discrimination principle established by the European Court Justice. 
There are, however, some Member States in which the necessary implementation has (at least partly) not taken place, so that the 
wording of the law still excludes foreign EU-based PBOs from holding equal tax status to domestic PBOs in one or more of the 
scenarios discussed above (sections 4.1. – 4.3).
5.1 Tax incentives for donors in cross-border cases
The following chart deals with the question of whether the Member States have adopted the non-discrimination rule in situations 
similar to the Persche case.
Country                                   
Can individual/corporate donors giving to comparable EU/EEA-based PBOs 
get the same tax benefits as they would for giving to a domestic PBO 
according to the wording of the law? 





Czech Republic Yes 
Denmark Yes, but the recipient organisation must be included in a list 
Estonia Yes 










Chart 4: (Non-)discrimination for donors according to the wording of the law
Malta Yes, but the recipient organisation must be included in a list




Slovakia No, but no tax incentives for local giving, so no discrimination
Slovenia Yes
Spain No
Sweden Yes, but the recipient organisation must be included in a list
United Kingdom Yes, but the recipient organisation must be included in a list 
As the chart shows there are three different solutions: 
1. In 21 Member States the wording of the law includes a non-discrimination rule; 8 of those Member States require a registration 
of the relevant PBO in a list. 
2. In one Member State, Slovakia, the wording of the law does not state a non-discrimination rule, but there is no discrimination 
because there are no tax incentives for donors.
3. In six Member States according to the wording of the law foreign EU-based PBOs are (still) discriminated against, even if they 
are comparable. In some of those countries the exclusion of foreign PBOs is explicit. In other countries there is no explicit 
exclusion, but  the interpretation given by the country expert working on this study indicates that foreign PBOs are still 
discriminated against.
One example of the difficulties encountered in interpreting the national laws can be seem when considering the Spanish law on 
foundations: Spanish tax law just refers to a “foundation” according to the Spanish foundation law. Whereas such a reference 
to the civil law status may be efficient for domestic foundations, it is self-evident that such a reference is not helpful as regards 
foreign foundations which naturally have a foreign civil law status. In such a case the reference of national tax law will have to be 
interpreted and two interpretations are possible: 
a. The reference means that the foreign-based foundation has to establish itself as a Spanish foundation in order to be eligible 
to hold tax-privileged status on equal terms to a domestic Spanish foundation.
b. The reference means that a foreign-based foundation has to apply the relevant requirements for the civil law status, 
which have to be checked by the Spanish tax authorities.      
 
If the first interpretation were applied, the wording of the law would violate the non-discrimination principle of the ECJ as it 
forces the foreign-based foundation to obtain the civil law status of a Spanish foundation. Only the second interpretation could 
be in line with the prescriptions of the ECJ (on the condition that the civil law status does not require the foundation to have its 
seat within the territory of Spain which would be against the non-discrimination rule of the ECJ). Thus only interpretation (b) 
would be acceptable and the real question is whether the law has to be clarified in order to avoid misleading interpretations like 
interpretation (a).
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5.2 Gift and inheritance tax in cross-border cases
The following chart deals with the question of whether the Member States have adapted their legislation to the non-discrimination 
principle for situations similar to the Missionswerk case.
Chart 5: (Non-)discrimination of foreign-based PBOs as regards gift and inheritance 
tax 
Country                                   
Where gift/inheritance tax exists and there are exemptions for donations 
to domestic PBOs, are the same benefits available for donations to a 
comparable EU/EEA based foreign-based PBO according to the wording of 
the law?
Austria Not applicable, no tax 
Belgium Yes  
Bulgaria Yes 
Croatia No
Cyprus Not applicable, no tax
Czech Republic Yes 
Denmark Yes, but the recipient organisation must be included in a list








Latvia Not applicable, no tax
Lithuania No 
Luxembourg Yes 
Malta Not applicable, no tax
Netherlands Yes, but the recipient organisation must be included in a list
Poland Not applicable, no tax
Portugal No
Romania Not applicable, no tax
Slovakia Not applicable, no tax
Slovenia Yes
Spain Not applicable, no tax levied on legal entities
Sweden Not applicable, no tax
United Kingdom Yes
As the chart above shows there are three different solutions: 
In 11 Member States the wording of the law explicitly provides a non-discrimination rule; 2 of 
those Member States require a registration of the relevant PBO in a list. 
In 10 Member States, there is no discrimination because there would be no taxation at all in 
such a case.
In six Member States, according to the wording of the law, foreign PBOs are discriminated 
against, even if they are comparable to a domestic PBO. Sometimes the exclusion of foreign 
EU-based PBOs from access to tax-privileged status is explicit. In other cases where the 
wording of the law is less clear, the interpretation given by the country expert working on 
this study indicates that foreign PBOs are still discriminated against.
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5.3 Tax treatment of the PBO in cross-border cases 
The following chart deals with the question of whether the Member States have adapted their legislation to the non-discrimination 
principle in a situation which is similar to the Stauffer case.
As the chart shows there are three different solutions employed by Member States: 
Chart 6: (Non-)discrimination of foreign-based PBOs as regards income taxation? 
Country                                                    
Where corporate income tax exemptions exist for domestic PBOs, are 
the same benefits available for comparable EU/EEA based foreign-based 
PBO according to the wording of the law?
Austria Yes

















Malta Yes, but the recipient organisation must be included in a list
Netherlands Yes 
Poland Yes  
Portugal No
Romania No
Slovakia No, but no tax incentives for PBOs, so no discrimination




1. In 16 Member States the wording of the law explicitly provides a non-discrimination rule; 2 of those Member States require a 
registration of the relevant PBO in a list. 
2. In two Member States, there is no discrimination because there would be no tax privileges at all in such a case.
3. In 10 Member States according to the wording of the law foreign EU-based PBOs are at least in certain aspects discriminated 
against, even if they are comparable to a domestic PBO. Again the exclusion is sometimes evident and sometimes indicated by 
the interpretation given by the country expert in cases where the wording of the law is less clear.
5.4 Conclusions 
According to the interpretation of the country experts it seems that most, but not all, Member States have implemented the non-
discrimination rule of the ECJ in case of tax benefits for foreign EU-based PBOs and their donors. However, there are still 22 out 
of a possible 84 cases(24)  where the wording of the law appears to discriminate against foreign EU-based PBOs. What happens in 
such cases where the law still excludes foreign EU-based PBOs from access to tax-privileged public-benefit status on equal terms 
with domestic PBOs?
According to the general rules of European law the national law must in those 22 cases be interpreted in such a way as to be 
in conformance with the European non-discrimination principle. This is even the case in the unsatisfactory circumstance that 
the wording of the law contradicts the actual legal situation (i.e. does not conform to the requirements of European law). Such 
situations are problematic because uninformed PBOs and donors may, simply on account of lack of clarity of the law, be prevented 
from obtaining tax incentives to which they are entitled. 
In such cases a Member State might be forced to formally amend its law through a European Commission Infringement Procedure. 
However, even where Member states formally no longer discriminate from a tax point of view, significant procedural barriers 
continue to exist for cross-border philanthropy as the next chapters will outline.
(24) Three scenarios (Persche/tax incentives for donors giving abroad; Stauffer/tax treatment of foreign PBO generating income; Missionswerk/gift and inheritance 
tax treatment of cross border legacies/inheritances) multiplied by 28 Member States gives 84 situations to consider.
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6. Procedural requirements – comparative 
overview
6.1 Introduction
The ECJ cases require Member States to not discriminate against comparable foreign EU-based PBOs and their donors from a tax 
point of view and the question is which procedures Member States have put in place to test the comparability of foreign-based 
public-benefit PBOs and their donors.
In all Member States that grant tax privileges to PBOs and their donors, the question arises as to how the comparability test to 
determine whether or not a foreign EU-based PBO can be considered as comparable to a domestic one. The benchmark for the 
comparability test is in each case established by the requirements of the national tax law, which will be further discussed in section 
7. 
6.2 Special regime vs. general provisions
As regards the procedural rules for the comparability test, the following approaches theoretically are possible:
• automatic recognition of a foreign EU-based PBO with a tax exempt status in its country of origin, 
• a special regime that governs the process and according to the specifications of which the comparability test for foreign      
 EU-based PBO is conducted, or 
• general provisions are applicable, as there are no express special provisions in place.
Different or hybrid approaches are of course also possible, putting in place specific provisions for the comparability test applying 
only to certain types of taxes and thus in turn to only certain scenarios, with other situations still governed by the general rules. 
The information provided by the country experts shows that a special procedural regime for foreign EU-based PBOs is the exception, 
while recourse to general provisions is common. No Member State has introduced automatic recognition of a foreign EU-based 
PBO with a tax exempt status in its country of origin. Thus in most cases the content of the procedural law applied in assessing 
the eligibility of a PBO for access to tax-privileged status is the same whether it is a domestic or a foreign EU-based organisation 
whose eligibility is being assessed. As the analysis will show, this approach presents some challenges for foreign EU-based PBOs 
and donors giving cross-border as to how much evidence/proof of fulfilment of the legal requirements the donors have to provide. 
It often depends on the authority practice how much detail/proof is required and if indeed the smallest detail has to be fulfilled. 
6.3 General decision vs. case by case decision
An important differentiation that can be identified is whether the comparability test is undertaken to apply only for the single 
specific case in which the tax concession is sought or whether it is carried out in such a way as to grant a more general access to 
tax privileges; namely whether eligibility for access to tax-privileged status for a foreign EU-based PBO is assessed on a case by 
case basis, or a general decision as to the status of that organisation is taken by an authority.  It is in general the tax authorities 
that are responsible for awarding tax-privileged public-benefit status. Differences exist between Member States as to whether it 
is the local tax authority where the seat of the organisation seeking the designation is located that is responsible for making the 
necessary checks, or whether the responsibility lies with a central tax authority that oversees the awarding of tax-privileged status 
in a particular region or throughout the whole country. 
As the chart below shows the case by case decision is most commonly found, but a general binding decision about elements of the 
status as tax-privileged PBO, which is then generally kept in a list is taken in some Member States.
Chart 7: Awarding tax-privileged status by the competent authority in cross-border 
cases: Is this a general decision (YES) vs. case by case decision (NO)?
Country                                   Persche Stauffer Missionswerk
Austria Yes No No such tax
Belgium No No No
Bulgaria No No No
Croatia No Yes No
Cyprus Yes Yes No such tax
Czech Republic No No No
Denmark Yes No Yes
Estonia No No No such tax
Finland Yes No No
France No No No
Germany No No No
Greece* No No No
Hungary No No No
Ireland Yes Yes Yes
Italy No No
Latvia No No No such tax
Lithuania No No
Luxembourg No No No
Malta Yes Yes No
Netherlands Yes No Yes
Poland No No No
Portugal No No No
Romania No No No such tax
Slovakia No No No such tax
Slovenia No No No
Spain No No No
Sweden Yes No No such tax
United Kingdom Yes Yes Yes
* Pending ministerial clarification
36 37
6.4 Performance of the 
comparability test
In either case the comparability test will begin with a check by 
the competent authority that the statutes of the PBO meet the 
requirements for the tax incentive in question. The burden of proof 
lies in general with the person or entity that will directly benefit from 
the tax privilege, namely the PBO itself or the donor. When it comes to 
foreign documents, this means that the authorities may require of the PBO 
or individual applying for the tax incentive that they provide a translation 
of the materials into the national language of the country from which the tax 
concession is sought. 
The authorities appear to have wide discretion as to what evidence of the status of 
a foreign-based PBO they require for the purposes of the comparability test. On the 
one hand, the comparability test may be straightforward, simply requiring that the foreign 
PBO is already recognised as eligible for and holds public-benefit status for tax purposes in its 
Member State of origin. Such an approach assumes sufficient comparability of the national laws 
of the Member States concerned. One example for such a practice can be found in Luxemburg in the 
“Persche” scenario (a donor from Luxembourg gives across border). The procedure for the comparability test 
here foresees that the donor submits a model certificate list of the PBOs including the following information: (a) Date 
of establishment according to which laws of which state, address, (b) PBO pursues exclusively one of the following purposes: Art, 
education, Philanthropy, Religion, Science, Social, Sports, Tourism, Development cooperation, (c) These purposes are recognised 
as eligible for tax incentives in the state of establishment, (d) PBO is exempt from income and wealth tax and the donation would 
be fiscally deductible in the country of establishment of the PBO. The certificate as well as the PBOs tax status in its country of 
establishment does not bind the Luxembourgian tax authority – the authority may in the end disregard the certificate/ask for 
additional information such as statutes of the PBO/financial reports etc. However there is at least an opportunity to perform the 
comparability test in a foreseeable and relatively unbureaucratic manner. 
On the other hand however (and this is the most common scenario), the authorities may require the submission of all relevant 
documents (statutes, annual report, balance sheet, evidence of the actual use of resources in the form of receipts, statements/
certificates etc., and potentialy specific questionnaires) in official translation, which can lead to considerable costs. The question 
as to how intensively the checks will be applied is therefore an important one in practical terms, but equally cannot be answered 
in a general way. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that even within one tax authority, individual officials may apply varying 
benchmarks. Furthermore it can be observed that large, well-recognised national or international PBOs have an advantage based 
on their reputation, which can result in less stringent checks being carried out. 
A special situation exists in those Member States where the civil law establishment of the PBO leads automatically to the recognition 
of public-benefit status for some or all relevant tax purposes, namely where the relevant requirements of civil and tax law are 
identical . In such cases the ongoing supervision of the actual management and activities of the PBO is nonetheless necessary and 
is carried out by the tax authorities. 
As some practitioners have outlined (see the examples provided in the Annex), the costs of gaining comparable status can be 
prohibitive to the cross-border recognition of PBOs. Invariably a foreign PBO will require the assistance of a lawyer in the other 
country in order to make a valid claim and provide an appropriate comparability analysis to support the claim. Where the benefits 
of recognition are small in value, the costs are likely to deter PBOs from exercising their rights under EU law unless a streamlined 
procedure can be adopted.
6.3.1 General binding decision on elements of the PBO status 
In case of a general decision, the following procedural rules are common: 
The decision is usually made ex ante (before the donor can ask for tax exemption for this recipient PBO or the PBO carries out 
activities) by a centralised authority, typically a tax authority or a ministry. The PBOs that have fulfilled the requirements of the 
comparability test are usually listed in a list or register. The status as tax-privileged PBO will typically remain valid until it is revoked. 
In some Member States the status has to be renewed after a specific period of time.
It should be noted that inclusion in the register on the basis of the information available as to the organisation’s nature and 
purpose at the time of the comparability test cannot guarantee absolute legal certainty, since only the statutes of the organisation 
and details of its management and activities up to the moment of entry in the register will have been checked, not the actual 
management and activities after the comparability test and entry into the register has taken place. 
6.3.2 Non-binding case by case decision for a specific tax status 
A case by case decision entails the responsible tax authority performing the test only for this specific case/request for a tax 
incentive of the PBO or its donor. This individual decision is not binding. This means it is not kept in any register/list and may be 
judged differently for the same PBO by another donor’s responsible local tax authority.
In the case of a case by case decision, the following procedural rules are common:
Typically the case by case decision will be made by the local tax authorities as an ex post assessment. An ex post assessment means 
that the PBO’s status is only verified and the decision as to whether it meets the requirements to receive the sought tax incentive 
only taken after the activities in relation to which the tax incentive is sought have been carried out. Some Member States may 
allow the PBO or its donor to apply for an ex ante assessment. An ex ante assessment entails that the PBO is assessed before it 
carries out its activities. 
An ex ante assessment clearly has the advantage of establishing greater legal certainty. It should however be kept in mind that 
public-benefit status, as noted above, is not static and requires continuous assessment: it is not enough that an organisation 
according to its statutes serves a public-benefit purpose; the organisation must in its ongoing practice follow its statutes and 
internal regulations and in addition comply with the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions, something that can only happen 
through ongoing fiscal supervision. An ex ante assessment can only ever be a check of the organisation’s statutes – the actual 
management and activities of the organisation during a given period can only be checked ex post. Absolute legal certainty for 
national or foreign-based PBOs is therefore not possible.
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7.1 Introduction
The benchmark for each comparability test is established by 
the requirements of the respective national tax law. 
It should first be noted that the provisions can differ in terms 
of scope: on the one hand, there are uniform standards 
that apply to all tax breaks and on the other hand there are 
differentiated provisions that have different requirements for 
incentives related to different types of tax. Thus, for example, 
the income tax deduction for a donation is sometimes only 
granted for certain public-benefit purposes, while other 
purposes, although not providing access to an income tax 
deduction for donors, are nonetheless recognised as being of 
public-benefit for tax purposes in relation to other types of tax 
(e.g. corporate income tax exemption of the PBO). 
Comparative legal analysis of the requirements for the 
tax-privileged status is a very challenging area. From a 
comparative legal perspective, it is necessary to note that the 
wording of the relevant laws often employs vague legal terms 
the interpretation of which leaves scope for a lack of clarity. 
Accordingly, there have even been a number of controversial 
cases dealing with the question of whether a national PBO 
meets the requirements of its own national public-benefit law.
Hence a comparative examination of the relevant provisions 
throughout the EU is even more complicated. Rules which 
seemingly have the same wording may have different 
meanings. It can also be the case that in one country a rule 
is explicitly codified, while in another no such rule is codified 
but is nonetheless applied in practice, the practice having been 
developed through the interpretation of undefined legal terms. 
This study focuses on the rules and requirements that 
comparative experience in the field has revealed as being the 
most central and fundamental in cross-border philanthropy 
scenarios. A comprehensive and exhaustive account of all 
existing rules in all Member States is not intended and, due to 
the current state of comparative legal research, is not possible.
The basic structure of the various national provisions can be 
classified as follows:
• It is often the case that only certain specific types of 
organisations and legal forms are recognised as being 
eligible for public-benefit status (relevant for being an 
eligible as a recipient for tax deductible donations and 
own tax exemptions for the PBO). 
• Furthermore it is necessary that a PBO promotes 
a particular public-benefit purpose with specific 
requirements in place as to how this purpose is to be 
pursued. 
• Sometimes there are requirements regarding the means 
by which the organisation may acquire its resources as 
well as formal requirements for the internal organisation 
of the PBO and the content of its statutes.
7.2 Legal form
In all surveyed countries, tax benefits are not limited to one 
legal form, but can apply to various forms (e.g. public-benefit 
foundation, association, limited liability company etc.). 
Most civil law countries provide for tax incentives for public-
benefit associations and public-benefit foundations and their 
respective donors. In several civil law and common law countries 
companies/corporations may also receive tax-privileged status 
(Austria, Germany, Netherlands and UK), whereas in other 
countries companies/corporations cannot get tax-privileged 
status (such as in France, Spain and Sweden). In common law 
the unincorporated tax-privileged organisation is frequently 
found (charitable trust or unincorporated association), but 
tax privileges are also granted to public-benefit organisations 
without legal personality in several civil law countries (e.g. 
Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden). With regard 
to the comparability test for charitable trusts, some civil law 
countries continue to argue that a charitable trust cannot 
be comparable to a civil law foundation because the relevant 
civil law does not recognise the trust as a valid legal entity. 
However in a decision of the Court of Appeal of Brussels, on 9 
September 2009 in the so called Great Ormond Street Hospital 
case, the Court states that a UK charitable trust, recognised 
by the Charity Commission, has specific characteristics that 
make it comparable with a non-profit legal entity in Belgium. 
As a consequence such kind of trust should benefit from 
the reduced tax rate. There is also some ECJ case law in 
the context of collective investment funds to the effect that 
foreign entities cannot be discriminated against solely on the 
basis of their legal form(25). It is hence expected that Member 
States will be prepared to apply this principle to charitable 
(25) e.g. ECJ 18.06.09 - C-303/07 (Aberdeen Property 
Fininvest). 
7. Benchmarks for the comparability test 
trusts without requiring another ECJ decision to this effect. 
Only in a few cases are there specific tax privileges that are 
only provided for certain types of PBOs and/or their donors 
(Germany provides for more tax incentives for public-benefit 
foundations and their donors in specific cases; and Austria 
provides for different solutions for incentives linked to 
different taxes). 
7.3 Public-benefit purposes
The tax-privileged status of a PBO, which leads to its tax 
exemption and to tax incentives for its donors, depends on the 
pursuance of a public-benefit purpose. Most countries  provide 
for either a general clause or an open clause as the basis to 
determine what purposes can be considered as being of public-
benefit (e.g. Netherlands and Spain) while other countries 
have a closed list of public-benefit purposes,  which has the 
advantage of more legal certainty but the disadvantage of less 
flexibility (e.g. Germany). In Hungary the closed list of public-
benefit purposes has been cancelled; it is not enough to simply 
choose a public-benefit activity but it is necessary to make 
reference to a suitable law, since the public-benefit activity 
should help in the accomplishment of a state or municipal 
public task defined within a law directly or indirectly.
The purposes accepted in the Member States vary according 
to the different national contexts and legal as well as social/
cultural traditions. Nonetheless, a common core of purposes, 
which seem to be accepted as being of public-benefit for tax 
purposes in all or at least most Member States, can be identified. 
These include: arts and culture; social welfare; poverty relief; 
humanitarian/disaster relief; support for children, youth and 
the elderly; science, research and innovation; education and 
training; health, well-being and medical care; and protection of 
vulnerable and disadvantaged persons.
7.4 Usage of funds
7.4.1 Exclusivity of the use of funds 
It seems that most Member States do require that in order 
to receive tax-privileged status a PBO must pursue its public-
benefit purpose exclusively. 
However, a few Member States would accept exemptions 
under special conditions: in Germany, a tax-privileged public-
benefit foundation may spend up to one third of its income on 
the living expenses of the founder or his/her close relatives or 
on the care of their graves (if the statutes of the foundation 
expressly allow this). In Denmark, whilst the purpose does 
not need to be pursued exclusively, tax privileges are only 
given for donations made to the public-benefit purpose. In 
Sweden, a limit is set that a maximum of 10% of all value of 
the foundation’s annual expenditure may be used for purposes 
other than the public-benefit purpose; the same is true for a 
Dutch foundation (with the legal form ANBI).
In order to avoid circumventions of the requirement to promote 
the public-benefit purpose exclusively, all Member States 
generally state that the assets of a public-benefit foundation 
cannot revert to private ownership upon dissolution of the 
PBO, but must go either to another PBO with similar aims to 
the dissolved entity (often to be stipulated in the statutes) or, 
in cases where this is not possible, to the state. 
7.4.2 Remuneration of board members
There are different traditions as regards the remuneration of 
board members of tax-privileged PBOs in the Member States.
In most Member States an adequate remuneration is accepted 
(an excessive remuneration is not accepted in any Member 
State, because this would be a circumvention of the rule to 
promote the public-benefit purpose exclusively). 
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In the following Member States, remuneration of board 
members by a tax-privileged PBO generally is not permitted: 
France, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Spain. The same is generally true in the UK, 
but UK charities can apply for permission from the Charity 
Commission if they wish to pay their trustees (it is currently 
under discussion if larger charities could do so without 
permission). It should however be noted that none of those 
Member States have similar restrictions as regards the 
remuneration of the staff. 
Thus in reality you may find different organisational structures 
in the Member States as a consequence of the remuneration 
rules for board members: in Member States which do restrict 
the remuneration of board members such board members 
will usually restrict themselves to a more supervisory role 
and the daily business of the organisation will be carried out 
by an executive staff member who can receive a reasonable 
salary. In the other Member States which allow adequate 
remuneration, the board members may also work as managing 
directors, doing a full-time job in exchange for an adequate 
remuneration.
With regard to the comparability test, a recent decision in 
Spain concerning the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond should be 
mentioned where the court held that the fact that remuneration 
of the foundation’s board members was permitted by Swedish 
law did not preclude the comparability of the Swedish 
foundation to a Spanish foundation.
7.4.3 Administration costs
In most Member States, the legislation does not explicitly 
specify that a tax-privileged PBO’s administration costs 
are subject to any fixed limitation. In the majority of these 
countries, however, there is in practice some form of limitation 
in place: examples are Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, and the UK. 
In a handful of Member States a specific limit on the 
administration costs of a tax-privileged public-benefit 
foundation is set: Belgium (maximum of 20% of resources), 
Denmark (must be approved by the authorities if exceeding 
12% of annual gross income), Latvia (maximum of 25% 
of general donations is stated in civil law), Lithuania (may 
not exceed 20% of fund’s annual income, including income 
from endowment), and Spain (should not exceed the highest 
amount of either 5% of a foundation’s equity or 20% of its 
net income). In the Czech Republic there is also a specified 
limitation, but with some choice about how the limitation is 
expressed: the statutes must announce that administration 
costs will not exceed a specified percentage of revenues 
from assets/endowment; or a specified percentage of the 
disbursements for the year; or a percentage of the assets/
equity as announced at end of the year.
Even in Member States where no explicit restrictions exist it is 
likely that there will be implicit restrictions. An interpretation 
of the requirement to promote the public-benefit purpose 
“exclusively” would prohibit unreasonable or excessive 
administration costs. 
7.4.4 Support of the “public at large” 
and not a limited section of the 
population 
Most Member States prohibit a tax-privileged PBO from 
supporting only a certain limited section of the population e.g. 
members of a family. 
In 13 Member States a tax-privileged PBO must explicitly 
serve “the public at large”: Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, and the UK. 
In other Member States this is not explicitly required but, the 
public nature of the benefit is determined on the basis of other 
criteria, e.g. in Greece, the section of the public that is benefited 
must be chosen on the basis of “an objective criterion”.
7.4.5 Activities abroad
In most Member States activities abroad do not put the tax-
privileged status of a PBO at risk. Only a few Member States 
have rules which restrict such activities. 
One of the very rare examples of an explicit rule can be found 
in Germany. While the judgement in the Stauffer-case was 
pending there was a tendency among the tax authorities of the 
German Länder to avoid granting tax privileges for donations 
to foreign countries, which are not developing countries. Later 
the law was amended to require that the activities “either 
have to support individuals which have their permanent 
residence in Germany or the activities could benefit Germany’s 
reputation”. The new wording of the law "could benefit" makes 
clear that it is necessary only that such a benefit is possible. 
Thus the tax authority is likely to interpret the provision in a 
way that only purposes or campaigns which are against the 
public order of Germany would fail the test. However, in such 
a case the purpose would in any case not be regarded as a 
public-benefit purpose. It seems therefore that the provision 
theoretically cannot limit cross-border giving. However it may 
create legal uncertainty and deter people from donating to 
foreign countries. Thus it seems that this kind of law provision 
is an example of symbolic legislation or "scarecrow legislation" 
(If the bird dares to land, the scarecrow is in fact not able to 
do anything).
A further example of a limitation of activities abroad on the 
basis of an interpretation of the law can be found in France: 
the French tax authorities, intending to comment on the 
new French tax law with a circulaire, had tried to add as an 
additional requirement the fact that the EU- or EEA-based PBO 
should pursue the main part (around 60%) of its activities in 
the French territory. Foundations and associations contested 
this position and the French government decided in July 2013 
to withdraw the tax administration comments/circulaire and 
to consult foundations and associations in the drafting of a 
new comment. Although the details are still in discussion, the 
condition relating to the carrying out of the main part of the 
activities in the French territory should not be maintained in 
the comment to be drafted. If such a limitation were to become 
law, it seems questionable whether it would be consistent with 
the ECJ judgement in the case Commission vs. Austria . 
7.4.6 Duty of timely disbursement 
In most of the Member States, there is no explicit requirement 
for tax-privileged public-benefit foundations to spend their 
income or a certain portion of their income on their public-
benefit purposes within a certain period of time. 
However, several Member States give a specification as to 
the amount of income and/or the time within which it must 
be spent in order for tax-privileged status to be retained. 
Examples are: Germany (income should be used before the 
end of the following year - this changed recently), Portugal 
(50% of income to be spent within 4 years of receipt), Spain 
(70% of net income to be spent within 4 years), and Sweden 
(required to use approximately 80% of income within a period 
of five years). 
Some countries’ legislations require more generally that 
income (or most of the income) be used towards the public-
benefit purpose within a “reasonable” period of time: Finland 
(most of the annual income, not including capital gains, within 
a reasonable time frame) and the UK (income should be spent 
within a ‘reasonable’ period – in practice generally accepted 
to be around 3 years). In Ireland while there is no explicit 
requirement for a tax-privileged PBO to spend its income 
within any specified period, to accumulate capital for more 
than 2 years, the PBO must first obtain permission from the 
tax authority.
7.5 Generation of funds
In almost all Member States, PBOs seem to be generally 
permitted to engage at least in some form of economic activity 
as regards the organisation law. One exception is, for example, 
Slovakia where the foundation law stipulates that economic 
activities of foundations are generally not permitted, with only 
limited exceptions provided for in the legislation. 
As regards tax law it should be noted that, that most 
Member States seem to distinguish between (purpose-)
related economic activities, promoting directly the public-
benefit purpose (e.g. running a museum in order to promote 
the purpose of arts and culture) and (purpose-)unrelated 
economic activities which only generate money to be spent 
for the public-benefit purpose (e.g. running a noodle factory). 
Of course there exist cases, where it is arguable, whether the 
activity should be regarded as related or unrelated economic 
activity (e.g. running a museum shop or a museum cafeteria).
Another question is the tax treatment of income generated by 
such an activity at the Member State level. The tax treatment of 
economic activity varies. Some Member States tax all business 
income in full. Most countries tax income from unrelated 
economic activity - in some cases if it exceeds a certain ceiling 
(in Germany income from unrelated economic activity below 
€35,000 is not taxed) and exempt economic activity related to 
the public-benefit purpose (in some cases only up to a certain 
ceiling). 
However, in some Member States the performance of major 
unrelated economic activities may put the tax-privileged 
status at risk. 
7.6 Further requirements
Additional elements can be found in some Member States tax 
laws and foreign EU-based PBOs and their donors should take 
them into account when wanting to meet the criteria for the 
comparability test in those countries.
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 C. Outlook and conclusions
8. Outlook
From a policy point of view, the main hurdle to solving existing 
barriers is a need among Member States a need to build 
more trust in each other’s systems by being assured that a 
certain level of control is guaranteed. Examples of attempts 
to develop simpler practice can be found in some Member 
States  (e.g. model certificate in Luxembourg) and it should be 
in the interests of all Member States as well as the sector (and 
society as a whole) to continue to try to simplify and ease the 
process of the comparability test.
From a legal point of view, different legal options to facilitate 
the determination of comparability and to establish greater 
legal certainty for all parties involved in the application of the 
comparability tests, do however exist. Five possible approaches 
are reviewed below. 
8.1 Implementation by 
multilateral or bilateral 
treaties
The Member States could develop uniform requirements for 
the status of a tax-privileged PBO through a multilateral treaty 
of all Member States. However, such an approach shows no 
real prospect of getting the unanimous approval of Member 
States that would be necessary for such an undertaking. The 
prospects for a move by national governments to harmonise 
their foundation tax law, to conclude a special multilateral 
tax treaty, or to make more use of double taxation treaties 
granting eachother’s PBOs automatic recognition for tax-
privileged status, is not much better. 
8.2 Automatic comparability 
of foreign PBOs in national 
tax laws
Member States could of course be encouraged to grant 
automatic exemption of any foreign EU-based organisation 
recognised as having tax exempt status for tax purposes in its 
country of origin. Seeing that Member States were not able 
to agree on such an automatic recognition for the European 
Foundation Statute(26) regulation, it is unlikely that they would 
at this stage be willing to grant automatic exemption to all 
other foreign EU-based tax-exempt PBOs since they do not 
appear to trust/know each other’s’ tax law requirements and 
efficiency of fiscal controls. 
8.3. Strictest common 
denominator of the national 
tax laws 
According to the non-discrimination principle of the European 
Court of Justice, it is unlawful for a Member State to deny tax-
privileged status to a foreign EU-based PBO if that PBO meets 
all that state’s requirements for a national PBO to hold tax-
privileged  public-benefit status, notwithstanding the location 
of its seat. 
Thus theoretically a foreign EU-based PBO would be 
automatically tax-privileged in all Member States, if it statutes/
bylaws were to combine all requirements of the tax laws of the 
Member States (de facto strictest common denominator), i.e., 
permitting only such public-benefit purposes as are allowed 
and would confer tax-privileged status in all Member States, 
prohibiting remuneration for the board of directors (like the 
(26) Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European 
Foundation (FE)  COM/2012/035
Spanish tax law ), requiring a duty of timely disbursement and 
several formal statements in the foundation’s statute (like the 
German tax law ), etc. Drafting model statutes could also be 
considered in this context, which would include the strictest 
common denominator of tax laws. PBOs could use the “model 
statutes” in order to be able to get the additional advantage 
of almost certainly being accepted as holding tax-privileged 
public-benefit status in all Member States.
There are two main objections against such an approach:
At first sight, such a tax-privileged status via model statutes 
may seem unrealistic, because it would be over-regulated 
and too ‘bureaucratic.’ However, according to the current 
information, the fundamental tax law requirements seem to be 
comparatively similar in most Member States. Model statutes 
may therefore be a viable means to facilitate the possibility for 
an organisation to hold tax-privileged public-benefit status in 
all Member States.
Nonetheless it is a big challenge to develop model statutes due 
to the legal uncertainty of the current tax legislation of the 
Member States. The guidance or least the assistance of the tax 
authorities would be needed in order to assure that the model 
statutes would really be accepted by the tax authorities of the 
relevant Member State. In case of amendments to the relevant 
law or its interpretation, model statutes would also need to be 
amended.
8.4 Common principles 
rather than detailed rules for 
equivalency determination
Another approach could be to encourage Member States 
fiscal authorities to focus their checks on a set of common 
principles rather than detailed rules. This need not prevent a 
state from imposing a detailed rule in a domestic context but it 
would require the state to make a broader based assessment 
for comparability purposes. For example, as the recent Spanish 
case shows (see Annex) it seems that a rule regulating the 
remuneration of board members need not constitute a key 
principle in its own right but can be considered as an aspect of 
a broader principle that PBOs should have a non-distribution 
constraint and avoid providing excessive private benefit. It 
should be sufficient for comparability purposes that each state 
restricts the ability of a PBO to provide private-benefit except 
where it is incidental to the provision of public benefit.
Member States had in the past (2007-2009) already tried to 
work towards better coordination via soft law approaches. 
However, at the time no agreement was found at the Council 
level. Times may however have changed and there may be more 
appetite and trust among Member States to further review the 
matter now. The idea could be to agree on core principles that 
tax authorities would check in cross-border cases.               
8.5 Facilitation of the 
procedural law
A significant easing of the process of equivalency determination 
could be achieved through the simplification of the way in 
which the comparability tests are carried out. 
Clear, simple and easy to understand procedures for how 
the comparability of a foreign based PBO is checked would 
be essential and the use of  model certificates (as used in 
Luxembourg) would be an innovative approach to consider in 
this regard.    
An alternative to the comparability test would be to limit the 
check that the specific donations received by the foreign PBO 
will be used in accordance with the national law of the Member 
State from which the tax incentive is sought. Obviously, this 
would ease the burden of proof for organisations receiving 
punctual donations from foreign donors.   
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ANNEX: How does comparability 
determination work in practice? 
The Wellcome Trust 
      By Paul Bater 
Wellcome Trust is an English charitable trust established to 
advance medical research and education in the history of 
medicine. Around 50% of its endowment, which each year 
generates investment income in the region of £230 million 
and funds charitable expenditure of around £800 million, is 
invested in a global portfolio of listed shares. 
Wellcome is generally exempt from UK tax on its investment 
returns. But when Wellcome makes investments in another 
country, that country usually exercises its right to tax the 
income from the investments. However, if the country is an 
EU or an EEA member state and it taxes a foreign investor at 
a higher rate than it applies to a comparable domestic investor 
that difference in treatment is likely to constitute an unjustified 
restriction of the free movement of capital protected by EU/
EEA law. 
It was the Stauffer case that alerted Wellcome to the possibility 
of filing tax reclaims on this basis.  Wellcome has filed refund 
claims in nine EU states and Norway going back as far as 
local time limits allow.  Four countries (Austria, Netherlands, 
Sweden and Norway) have settled our claims in full. The other 
five have either totally or partially rejected our claims or have 
not yet addressed the merits of the claim. 
To undertake these reclaims procedures, it is necessary to 
appoint a local adviser with suitable expertise in each country 
where we filed a claim. It may also be necessary for a charity 
to liaise closely with its custodian to obtain the documents 
required to support the claim. In our experience no two 
countries have the same procedure. The supporting documents 
that are required may include certificates of tax residence, 
withholding tax vouchers, audited accounts, governing 
documents (constitution, statutes, articles, etc.), evidence of 
receipt of income and its application to public benefit activities 
- with translation and notarisation where appropriate.   
States that impose withholding tax in breach of EU law will 
not voluntarily refund the tax to foreign charities and the 
European Commission cannot require them to do so. It is up to 
each foundation to prove its case under the relevant national 
law procedure. Wellcome only makes claims where it is cost 
effective to do so, so the amount of tax involved in each country 
has to be large enough to make the exercise worthwhile. The 
total costs to date incurred by Wellcome for filing claims, 
comparability analysis, claim validation, appeals and litigation 
costs in the ten countries concerned total around £900,000. 
This compares favourably with total refunds to date of over €8 
million from the four states that have settled our claims in full 
and the prospect of further refunds from the other countries 
that continue to dispute our claims. 
Riksbankens Jubileumsfond
       By Göran Blomqvist and Anna Mogård
Stiftelsen Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (RJ) is an independent 
foundation that promotes and supports academic research 
related to Sweden. The foundation funds in Sweden as well 
as in other countries. RJ can invest in all types of financial 
instruments and structures that are on the market, and 
investments are made in Sweden and abroad. We buy and 
sell shares on the stock market in Stockholm as well as in a 
number of other cities, a substantial part of them inside the 
EU. Around 28% of our assets are in international shares. 
The national tax authorities of several EU countries have 
withheld tax levied on the dividends from these investments. 
With the support of external tax advisors, we have had some 
recent successes in reclaiming foreign tax from the UK and 
Spain; claims from Italy and Belgium have been rejected; and a 
case in Germany is pending.
The Spanish case in particular was something of a 
breakthrough. Initially launched in May 2009, we received a 
final and favourable judgement in November 2013, after appeal 
proceedings in the administrative and then the high court. 
The key issue in this case was proving the comparability of RJ 
with a Spanish public-benefit foundation. RJ’s board members 
are remunerated. This is regulated by the law governing the 
remuneration of the Swedish Parliament, which ensures that 
such remuneration by the Riksbankens foundation is limited, 
transparent, and audited. However, board remuneration is 
prohibited for Spanish foundations. Our case succeeded in 
demonstrating that comparable does not mean identical - 
differences in the national legal contexts in which foundations 
are established do not rule out that they can be found to be in 
essence comparable. 
The comparative legal analysis shows that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice requiring a non-discrimination of 
PBOs of other Member States has led to the comparability test being the method used by Member States to determine whether 
or not a foreign-based PBO is eligible for tax-privileged status. The comparability test is, when compared with the legal situation 
that preceded it, a significant step forward: where as in the past, foreign EU-based PBOs were simply excluded from the eligibility 
to have their public-benefit status recognised for tax purposes by other Member States, now the possibility is open. But this study 
does show, that the way in which the non-discrimination principle is currently implemented is not an entirely satisfactory solution. 
Concluding remarks by EFC/TGE
We see that the foundation sector and philanthropy more broadly have become increasingly international but that the fiscal 
environment is still far from being satisfactory. The landmark judgements of the European Court of Justice force Member States not 
to discriminate foreign EU-based public benefit organisations and their donors. However, this study reveals that barriers continue 
to exist. Several Member States have not yet removed discrimination and even where they have, problems remain. PBOs and their 
donors encounter a lack of legal clarity, long and complicated procedures, and significant additional translation and consultancy 
costs to show their comparable status. Within the EU no formal or uniform approach to the comparability test is foreseen: Usually it 
is the competent tax authority who decides on a case by case basis whether a foreign PBO is considered comparable to a domestic 
one.
 The benchmark for the comparability test is generally the national tax law of the Member State from which the tax incentives are 
sought and the crucial question is always in what level of detail this benchmark has to be fulfilled. We consider that “comparable” 
in the context of cross-border philanthropy should not mean “identical” and imply fulfilment of all precise details of respective 
national tax laws but rather that the organisations have to be in essence comparable. The EFC and TGE together with other 
partners are committed to working towards further developing and implementing best practices and proposals made in this study 
to further ease tax effective cross-border philanthropy.  Apart from incremental improvements that should be encouraged at 
national level, the most feasible option appears to be to try to put the focus of Member States’ fiscal authorities on a set of core 
principles for the comparability test. There are already interesting practices developed, and the Luxembourg model certificate 
certainly being one of them.
 The main problem in finally resolving the landlock is still the issue of control and trust among Member States. We can however be 
hopeful that with the non-discrimination principle having now been in force for several years, Member States will be more willing 
to address the issue.
 This study may provide the ground for a roadmap for the years to come. 
9. Conclusions
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The outcome of this case is that a refund of approximately 
€237,000 plus €85,000 in interest for the years 2005-2008 
was approved. The cost of the process for RJ was around 
€50,000. In total across all its claim in various countries, RJ 
has received refunds amounting to some €2.4 million, with 
around half a million being spent on tax advisors between 
2006 –2013.
One way to save costs in the long term is to obtain public-
benefit tax exempt status in other countries. We have obtained 
such status in Norway, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands 
and USA.
UK charitable trust versus Belgian 
public-benefit foundation 
      By Francis Houben, Legal & Tax Management SPRL
The non-discrimination principle on cross border gifts 
and legacies has fully been implemented in Belgian law. 
Nonetheless, problems remain concerning the way in which 
the tax administration should proceed concretely when it has 
to examine a cross border legacy. An interesting example to 
consider is the Great Ormond Street Hospital case. This case 
concerns a resident of Brussels Region who made a legacy to 
a UK charitable trust in 1999. In its decision of 9 September 
2009, the Court of Appeal of Brussels found that where a 
UK charitable trust is in a situation that can be compared 
with the situation of the legal entities mentioned in the 
Belgian inheritance tax code the reduced rate of inheritance 
tax should be applied. This is despite that fact that Belgian 
inheritance tax law focuses almost exclusively on the legal 
form of the beneficiary and the UK charitable trust does not 
have a legal personality. The key element of this decision is the 
fact that the registration of the charitable trust by the Charity 
Commission and additional specific characteristics “confer to 
this trust a legal identity which could be compared with the 
legal personality in Belgium”. This decision is remarkable, 
since it does not limit itself to a strict and literal interpretation 
of the law. 
Since the facts of the Great Ormond Street Hospital case took 
place, the tax regime in Belgium has undergone changes. 
Reduced tax rates now vary according to legal form. In the 
Brussels Region public-benefit foundations benefit from a 
much lower tax rate than associations or private foundations 
(6.6% versus 25%). A recent case has raised the question as 
to which rate should apply in cross-border cases – can it be 
shown that a UK charitable trust should be taxed at the rate 
of a public-benefit foundation? A number of elements suggest 
that the charitable trust is closely comparable with a public-
benefit foundation: Both have only one governing body, can 
be constituted unilaterally through a will, imply the idea of 
endowment of funds and sustainability or permanency and 
the pursuance of a public-benefit purpose and support for the 
general public. Charitable trusts as well as the Belgian public-
benefit foundations need to receive a formal approval on their 
public-benefit status - for charitable trusts this approval is 
given by the Charity Commission, while the “Fondation d’utilité 
publique” should follow a comparable procedure by submitting 
its statutes to the approval of the Ministry of Justice. 
To verify comparability, the Belgian tax authorities sought 
to obtain a document of the UK authorities stating that the 
English entity can be considered as public-benefit foundation. 
Such a document was impossible to obtain, since the word 
“foundation” does not exist in the English legislation. However, 
as an alternative solution a declaration of the UK tax authority 
HMRC confirming their acceptance of the trust as charitable 
according to the recognition by the Charity Commission, 
attaching a copy of a brochure of the Charity Commission 
describing the criteria that should be met in the UK on the 
“public-benefit purpose”, was provided. The case, which was 
still pending when the EFC workshop was organised, was 
finally solved two months later: the tax authorities accepted 
the abovementioned point of view and applied the reduced 
rate for public benefit foundations (6.6%). This is excellent 
news for UK charitable trusts receiving expecting legacies 
from Belgian donors.
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